

Climate controversies  
and negotiations process:

Re-thinking the climate regime

Amy Dahan, Senior Researcher  
Centre Alexandre Koyré (CNRS-EHESS)

# Thèse 1

**L'échec de Copenhague et plus largement l'enlisement du processus de négociations internationales ne sont PAS dus principalement aux controverses sur les sciences du climat.**

**Cet échec reflète l'état actuel du rapport de forces à l'échelle géopolitique et le nouvel ordre mondial.**

# Thèse 2

Néanmoins, il y a bien **un processus de *COPRODUCTION* entre science et politique du régime climatique.**

La crise touche à la fois le processus politique, le cadrage scientifique et la relation entre eux. Elle est profonde, non contingente et généralisée. Tous les aspects du régime, y compris le GIEC sont attaqués successivement.

La crise actuelle témoigne de **la fin d'un cycle**, entamé il y a plus de vingt ans.

# Thèse 3

Le GIEC a fait son “job” très honorablement mais il ne peut pas tout faire.

L'idée qu'il suffirait d'une expertise scientifique solide et suffisamment alarmante, pour pousser les politiques à agir au niveau de gouvernance globale s'avère être erronée.

Le débat post Copenhague, montre différentes appréciations du risque climatique. Vouloir mettre tout le monde d'accord sur une base scientifique est une illusion. Ceci a des implications pour le GIEC.

## 4. ? Que faire

Comment gérer l'après Copenhague ? Sachant que le défi climatique :

- est un problème non seulement global, comme on l'a trop laissé entendre, mais véritablement **échelles-multi**
- ,échappe au paradigme des problèmes de pollutions

et

- ”que la notion de “politiques climatiques
- (Beck.voir U) *d'environnement* ainsi que la catégorie ont sérieusement besoin d'être repensé s.

# The crisis

Failure or not failure ?

- The crisis concerns the political process, the scientific framing and the relation between the two aspects
- The attacks against IPCC are signs of this crisis. I take them seriously. They touch legitimacy, neutrality, validity of consensus.

Two dimensions of the climate regime are particularly concerned :

- The relationship between science and politics ; with the singular institution of IPCC
- The onusian system of climate governance , constructed since 1990 around a strategy of sharing reductions objectives.

# Thesis 1

The failure of Copenhagen Conference is not contingent. It reflects the fundamental wishes of the hegemonic powers of the geopolitical scene and the limits they don't want now to overcome. The negotiation process blocked mainly on questions of national sovereignty, in the context of severe economic competition between them. Climate sciences controversies didn't play any role in that failure. Emerging economies, as the US, are very far from any environmental discourse and for them climate change is mainly a question of de-carbonization of economies at a rhythm which doesn't threaten their growth.

The hope for a cosmopolitan governance (U.Beck) of the climate problem is over, so do are the hopes for a new treatise Kyoto 2

# For 20 years, the climate regime was mainly constructed around three pillars:

- A political process and a climate assessment : separated but closely linked
- A strategy of « cake sharing » :
  - Kyoto protocol until 2012
  - the search of another treatise with US and the big emerging economies, with objectives of reductions, an agenda, according a formula (capacities, historical responsibilities)
- A clear distinction between industrialized countries and developing countries, with also a distinction between subjects concerning them: mitigation and reductions versus adaptation and transfers (finance and technologies)



# Coproduction

Refers to the idea of a joint construction between scientific order and political order and of devices or institutions which go on with it

General circulation models, global concepts (mean temperature, mean level of the seas..) and global political treatment of the problem reinforce each other

IPCC- SBSTA a certain coproduction of the assessment

Hybrid objects: i.e. dangerous threshold of 2°C

## Thesis 2

An increasing and very worrying gap appeared at Copenhagen between:

1) an alarming expertise, constructed around some key numbers, thresholds, carbon budgets etc, which presupposes an efficient top-down and global governance,  
2) the bottom up approach which prevailed in the Agreement imposed by US and China which wished only national policies, without constraining objectives.

The scientific expertise is fragilized. In these conditions, adopting the key number of 2°C as the dangerous threshold without saying how to avoid this temperature is the triumph of an “economy of promises”

## Thesis 3

For the IPCC, the shift between a purified position of “science- speaking- truth- to- power” and a very complex and hybrid practice cannot last anymore

The IPCC made a good scientific work, and a reflexive expertise. But he was also a crucial political actor, winning alliances, creating trust, increasing the consciousness on the climate risk, unifying a vast field of researches about the domain.

He must assume this double function which is not a shame but is inherent to expertise work at this level.

# IPCC

The three groups of IPCC are composed of different disciplines, with distinct temporalities, methods, and uncertainties. They don't have the same function

The results and numbers given by climate modeling will continue to play a role of “coagulator” between different actors on the public space.

The socio-economic scenarios could be crucial in the discussions about future, if they become more transparent and explicit about what has to be done and assessing the climate policies

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We are living a convergence between different crisis: environmental, climatic, energetic, economic and financial. Several contributors to the climate debate are right to suggest that a lot of climate policies could be taken with other reasons.

### Mainstreaming climate challenge ?

But a bigger effort of coordination has to be done between , arenas like OMC and UNFCCC, or several policies (health, environment, reductions of CO2 emissions)

The debate about measures and policies has to acquire more autonomy regarding the scientific debate.

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scales-It is a multi .Climate change is not only a global problem  
:problem which has to be tackled at all possible levels  
,firms ,regions ,cities ,by nations ,European level ,international  
industries .people etc ,industrial sectors ,

The onusian governance system focuses all the waiting around the  
with a global voluntarism which tends to mask the ,global level  
.eblockages and the possible advances at other levels of governanc  
rderWe plead for a “principle of subsidiarity” in climate arena in o  
and to ,to support and enlarge all local and national initiatives  
.lighten the international agenda of the negotiations

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are still exceptional meetings between a )CoP(Climate arenas  
very useful to launch new ,huge variety of actors and stakeholders  
to discuss questions which had ,solutions etc ,technologies ,ideas  
,equity ,green development‘ :no other public forums  
world solidarity... ,responsibility  
has been much more useful that *off* the ,In the balance of the CoPs  
*in* the

The exceptional mobilization of the civil society at Copenhagen  
This presence is .confirms the importance of these arenas  
important.argument to keep these arenas

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